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In addition to the euro crisis the EU faces a second, more existential 
crisis, in the form of an ill-defined notion of the Union’s global role. This 
contribution argues that the euro crisis should not redefine perceptions 
of the EU on the global stage, which it is in danger of doing. Instead, the 
EU and its members should embark upon a strategic reassessment in 
order to define three core interrelated factors. First, the nature of the EU’s 
actorness remains ill-defined and it is therefore necessary to explain, 
both within and beyond the Union, what its global role is. Second, 
in order to facilitate the joining up of the myriad of sub-strategies in 
EU external relations, the notion of ‘red lines’ should be considered 
which define specific aspects of behaviour that are mainstreamed 
throughout the EU’s external actions and, more importantly, upheld. 
Third, in spite of the rapid development of the harder elements of the 
EU’s actorness over the last decade or so, there remains a worrying 
gap between rhetoric and reality. This aspect is of particular concern 
for the United States and will affect perceptions of the EU’s ability to 
be a genuine strategic partner at a time of dramatic change in the 
international system. By engaging in what will inevitably be a difficult 
debate, the EU and its members will not only help give purpose and 
strategic direction to the Union’s actions on the international scene, 
it will also speak to the euro crisis since both are fundamentally about 
the future shape and direction of European integration.
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Introduction
As the EU finance ministers conclude another meeting on 
the euro crisis, it is remarkable how little thought has been 
given to the ramifications of this crisis upon the Union’s 
external actions. The focus on the euro crisis has, so far, had 
two negative effects upon the EU’s external actions. First, it 
has distracted attention from the urgent need for thought and 
debate about the Union’s attempts to build a more coherent, 
effective and visible role for itself on the international stage 
in the face of a rapidly changing global order1. Second, the 
euro crisis is in danger of defining the EU’s external image in 
the absence of any concerted efforts to otherwise define the 
Union’s global role. With this in mind, this contribution calls for 
a parallel and complementary debate on the EU’s global role.
The need for this debate has been evident for some time and 
pre-dates the euro crisis. If we cast our minds back over the last 
decade (back to the Convention on the Future of Europe) the 
most pressing issue was the need for the EU to present a more 
coherent, effective and visible face to the world. What eventually 
became the Lisbon Treaty was supposed to help address this 
at a structural and procedural level, leaving the more political 
debate about defining the EU’s 
place in the changing global 
constellations to the newly 
appointed senior posts in the 
Union and to the heads of 
state and governments of the 
members. Events, however, 
have a way of interfering with 
the best laid plans2.
These events took the form 
of the global financial crisis 
and the connected euro 
crisis. Efforts to grapple 
with the latter have been 
characterised by not 
only their complexity but 
also fundamental disagreements about the nature of the 
crisis, or more precisely, crises (since the crisis has fiscal, 
competitiveness and banking aspects to it). Some have even 
suggested that it may not even be primarily about economics 
or finance but is political and ‘even largely presentational’ 
in nature3. Any resolution to the crises mentioned above 
will ultimately depend upon the ability to restore economic 
growth in the near future, notwithstanding any necessary 
institutional engineering or treaty amendments. 
While, for understandable reasons, much of the attention has 
focused on the euro crisis, a second more existential crisis is 
looming. This crisis stems from the lack of any real clarity about 
the EU’s global role and how it wishes to engage in and shape 
the emerging international order. The euro crisis is already 
shaping third party perception of the EU due to the simple fact 
that much of the Union’s presumed external attractiveness 
has been based upon the export of its internal values and 
principles4. Hence, if the attractiveness of the EU’s model 
of integration as exemplar is tarnished, the euro crisis risks 
redefining perceptions of the EU’s global role in a negative 
manner. Indeed, as explained below, there is already some 
evidence that this is happening. Yet, to equate the euro crisis 
as the cause for the second, more existential, crisis would be 
a mistake since, as Björn Fägersten has aptly observed, ‘while 
Europe is in decline in relation to the resources it can devote to 
foreign policy and its ability to act as a unified actor, the euro-
crisis has not caused, but only exacerbated, ongoing trends’5.
Any ensuing strategic debates about the EU’s global role 
should therefore actively consider the wider ramifications of 
the euro crisis but at the same time it should not circumscribe 
the parameters of these broader exchanges. In so far as there 
is mention of the EU’s global role in the debates surrounding 
the euro crisis, it is often couched in terms of geo-economics 
and the EU’s role in the G20 as the ‘vector for Europe to speak 
with one voice in the world’6. The temptation for the EU to 
define its external role in geo-economic terms, based upon its 
traditional strengths in trade and the (still unclear) results of 
the euro crisis, runs the risk of neglecting the more political 
and normative underpinnings of the Union’s external role.   
Any such reassessment must therefore be undertaken with 
one eye on the wider effects of the euro and wider global 
financial crises, but with an equally firm gaze on longer-term 
geo-political dimensions.
The arguments below suggest that the developing debates 
about the EU’s global role were truncated by the euro crisis. 
Notwithstanding the euro crisis, it is argued that there is an 
urgent need for the Union to 
adopt a global perspective on its 
role, complete with a clearer idea 
of what links its numerous sub-
strategies in its external actions. 
It is suggested that one such 
linkage might be found in the 
delineation of specific ‘red lines’ 
that would inform all of the sub-
strategies. These red lines should 
then be mainstreamed through 
the various sub-strategies 
so that the character of the 
EU’s international role and its 
actorness become more visible 
and coherent. 
Beyond the delineation of red lines, any strategic perspective 
should also consider how comprehensive the EU wishes to 
be as a global, or even regional, actor. This will involve more 
serious thinking about the Union’s ‘harder’ facets and whether 
the Member States have the necessary will and resources to 
underpin the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). 
The extent to which the EU is persuasive on this point will be 
of critical importance to the reformulation of the EU’s most 
important external partnership and, arguably, its only real 
one – the United States. Although dialogue with the EU’s 
nine other strategic partners, and beyond, should be part and 
parcel of any such strategic reassessment, the United States 
is unique in its global reach and its comprehensiveness as an 
actor. Just as the EU needs the United States, the latter requires 
a strategically-oriented and capable partner.
A truncated debate
There were attempts to articulate the Union’s role on the 
international stage prior to the Lisbon Treaty, such as those 
voiced in the European Convention a decade ago. In the 
interim between the Convention and the adoption of the 
Lisbon Treaty, a number of official documents, such as Solana’s 
A Secure Europe in a Better World: The European Security 
Strategy7, or the Commission’s June 2006 Europe in the World 8,  7
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the Report on the Implementation of the European Security 
Strategy9 on December 2008, all amplified the need for a more 
coherent, effective and visible Europe on the world stage. This 
accounts for the fact that of the 62 amendments made to its 
predecessors, the Treaties of Rome and Maastricht, no fewer 
than 25 applied to provisions on foreign and security policy10.  
There were even signs that, post-Lisbon, the newly ensconced 
President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, 
wished to pursue the dialogue when he observed that the 
main challenge facing the EU is ‘how to deal, as Europe, with 
the rest of the world’ 11. Whatever momentum was building up 
in response to this crucial question was soon overshadowed   
by the global financial crisis and the ensuing euro crisis. 
All is not lost though. For example, the last two Gymnich 
meetings of EU foreign ministers, under the Danish and 
Cypriot Presidencies respectively, noted the importance of 
horizontal issues, or ‘those issues that are so important for our 
relationship in the world and on which it 
is so important that we are engaged’12.   
The Future of Europe Group, which 
combined 11 foreign ministers meeting   
in a personal capacity, made a strong 
plea for ‘a comprehensive and integrated 
approach to all components of the EU’s 
international profile’13. In spite of the 
preoccupation of the European Council of 
18-19 October with ‘re-launching growth, 
investment and employment’, they still 
found time to note the need to ‘improve 
the EU’s external relations’ 14. The European Council made 
reference to an earlier meeting in September 2010 which 
noted that the economic and financial crisis ‘has dramatically 
shown the extent to which the well-being, security and quality 
of life of Europeans depend on external developments’ and 
that ‘the emergence of new players with their own world 
views and interests is also an important new feature of the 
international environment’ 15. In this spirit subsequent reviews 
of six key strategic partners (a term that itself lacks any 
strategic precision) commissioned by this European Council 
were disappointingly general and inconclusive and did little to 
elucidate a wider role for the Union on the international scene16.  
It would therefore be an exaggeration 
to claim that the understandable 
concentration on the immediate 
exigencies of the euro crisis has 
completely obliterated consciousness of 
the need for the EU to think and act more 
strategically in its external actions. For 
those readers who doubt the wisdom, or 
even the ability of the EU or its Member 
States to think and act more strategically, 
it is worth noting that the EU adopted an 
internal security strategy in 2010 which 
involved public debate, consultation 
with numerous internal stakeholders, 
the advancement of a security ‘model’,     
a clear idea of objectives and the   
matching of the latter to resources and existing policies17.  
Although a strategy for the EU’s external posture will inevitably 
be a good deal more complicated, the onus of drawing up 
any such strategy need not be entirely cast upon the EU’s 
institutions or the EEAS, especially when there is mounting 
external interest and a willingness to contribute to any such 
process, as shown by the European Global Strategy initiative18. 
Thinking globally to solve local problems
It is a truism to observe that the world moves on, but what 
is significant about the current reconfiguration of the world 
order is that this is being done with relatively little EU input 
and, importantly, in the absence of a clear strategic vision 
of the Union’s role in the changing constellations. The first 
issue therefore is the nature of the EU’s role in the emerging 
international system. 
Historically the EU’s role in external relations developed 
around trade and development. This has posed the challenge 
of fitting the more recent foreign and security dimensions 
into the relatively well developed and defined (former) 
communautaire aspects. One option, therefore, would be to 
strengthen the Union’s strengths in these realms – a move 
which might also be suggested by the ramifications of the 
euro and global financial crises. This option would also play 
to the real strengths of European-level 
diplomacy which have historically been 
in the trade area. If the EU is to become a 
pragmatic and essentially geo-economic 
actor, a different set of calculus apply than 
those suggested for a Union that seeks to 
promote normative values built around its 
founding principles19. In the case of the 
former, a realpolitik perspective is called 
for, centred on defending the economic 
interests of the Union. This would suggest 
a highly pragmatic foreign policy geared 
towards opening and sustaining market access. It would be 
trade led and based upon material interests, emphasising the 
negotiation of free trade area agreements. Any wider foreign 
and security policy considerations would be subservient to 
this trade-led perspective. As Richard Youngs has suggested, 
this is exactly the approach adopted towards Asia with ‘no 
strategic perspective in Asia beyond a race for commercial 
contracts and reversal of its weakening economic presence’20.  
The development of the foreign and security policy aspects 
since the 1990s, the end of the Cold War and the attribution 
of legal personality to the EU under the Lisbon Treaty, has 
introduced far more concern with the more normative aspects 
of the Union’s global role. However, any credible strategic 
approach to the EU’s global role cannot be based solely on 
lofty principles, but will also have to include elements of 
pragmatism. As the EU and its members struggle to balance 
values and interests, it is important to bear in mind that values 
should inform interests, whereas interests may distort values. 
The obvious danger posed by the euro 
crisis is that instead of broad normatively-
informed principles and objectives being 
applied to the EU’s external policies, 
Member States may be driven to prioritise 
short-term economic gains and interests 
over longer-term common goods.8
The obvious danger posed by the euro crisis is that instead of 
broad normatively-informed principles and objectives being 
applied to the EU’s external policies, Member States may be 
driven to prioritise short-term economic gains and interests 
over longer-term common goods. There is already some 
evidence that ‘covert forms of protectionism’ are on the rise, 
reversing the idea of economic openness which has been one 
of the fundamentals of the EU’s common commercial policy21.  
An acceptance of variable-speed integration on fiscal affairs 
may further undermine the external logic of a united front on 
foreign policy.
The impression that the EU 
and its members are acting in 
more geo-economic and self-
interested ways has already 
prompted some, such as the 
Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), to 
‘start to question’ the much 
touted European model 22. 
The corrosive effects of  similar 
impressions may be quite 
profound on other areas of   
the world, such as the southern 
Mediterranean, where, in light 
of the Arab spring, the EU 
promised to not only deliver 
on the three ‘M’s’ (money, 
markets and mobility), but to actively promote the concept 
of ‘deep democracy’ and the principle of ‘more for more’. Any 
impression that the EU is less than sincere about the more 
normative elements of its external relations will only erode 
the sympathies of young Arabs and undermine EU policy in 
the area. The failure to engage regimes, civil society and even 
social media in a normatively informed dialogue threatens to 
condemn the EU and its members to exactly the kind of trade-
first relations promoted under the regimes that have just been 
overthrown. One of the more awkward questions for the EU 
and its members emanating from the Arab spring is where its 
much vaunted principles and values were in the EU’s relations 
with the supplanted regimes. Challenges like these demand a 
strategic response.
Ideally, any strategic reassessment of the EU’s global role 
should take account of both geo-economic and geo-political 
interests, balanced by the promotion 
of core values and principles. The 
EU’s ability to export its particular 
model of regional integration can 
be historically attributed to this 
fusing of economic and political 
liberalism. On paper, the promotion 
of market economies is the flip side 
of democratisation and a human rights coin. The obvious 
danger posed by the euro crisis is that the tie between the 
two may be weakened, especially if the response involves 
protectionism, the relaxation of state aid rules, bilateral (and 
inconsistent) trade agreements and the jealous protection 
of its advantageous representation in many international 
organisations. The dangers of a potentially widening gap 
between the internal realities of European integration and the 
substance of the EU’s external actions are nicely reflected by 
Justin Vaïsse and Hans Kundnani: 
 
  As a conflicted and divided Europe drifted towards economic   
  stagnation and political gridlock, so the model for which   
  the EU stands – that of an expanding and ever more effective   
  multilateralism as a solution to the problems of a globalised   
  world – was also discredited in the eyes of others. Emerging   
  powers such as Brazil and China understandably wondered   
  why they should pay to help rescue a continent which is   
  proving unable to get its act together even though it has the   
  resources to do so – let alone why they should listen to its   
  lectures about regionalism and good governance23. 
This is the crux of the problem. 
The credibility of the EU’s 
external policies has always 
depended upon its ability to 
export a particular model of 
integration as exemplar. The 
construction of the Union 
internally enables the EU to 
extol its variant of regional 
integration elsewhere in the 
world. Similarly, the promotion 
of the EU externally as exemplar 
is part of the reaffirmative 
process of the continuing 
construction of the Union and 
its identity. The danger is that 
at the core of the EU’s advocacy 
are its much vaunted social 
model and the internal market, both of which are under fire 
not only from the euro crisis but also longer-term economic 
malaise and shifting demographics. The juxtaposition 
between a Union that continues to export its model of 
integration, even if less convincingly, whilst engaging in geo-
economically driven trade and energy deals will further erode 
the EU’s overall appeal and ability to shape the emerging 
world order. Youngs noted the existence of this uncomfortable 
duality when he observed that, ‘It is unsustainable for the EU 
to think that it can bask in post-modernism within Europe 
while guarding such a supposedly Kantian paradise through 
realist bargaining outside its borders’24. 
Given that European integration is based around a 
reaffirmative process between internal and external politics, 
it is logical to suggest that the adoption of a clearer strategic 
view of the EU’s global role, its aims and interests, may shape   
the internal dialogue. This is all the 
more necessary if log-jam or paralysis 
threatens internally. In order to 
do so, the EU and its members will 
have to develop a keener sense of 
the Union’s overarching strategic 
interests and values.
Red lines?
Paradoxically, the EU is drowning in strategies, but lacks a 
strategy. In so far as one can talk of strategy in EU external 
actions, they are contained in no less than ‘134 individual 
country strategies ... strategies for most regions (Central Asia, 
the Andes, etc.), thematic issues (counterterrorism, non-
proliferation, etc.), even whole continents (Asia, Africa, and 
Antarctica)’25. This approach to countries and regions is typical 
of the process-driven type of foreign policy practiced by the 
EU, with broad similarities between the individual country or 
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region agreements. In a similar vein, the presence of numerous 
dialogues with the strategic partners is often portrayed as a 
badge of pride, with less attention paid to what the dialogues 
actually achieve or a clear strategic conception of what the EU 
wishes to attain. The situation is somewhat reminiscent of the 
Dodo’s mantra in Alice in Wonderland (‘Everybody has won,   
and all must have prizes’). In this context, all shall have summits.  
The need for a common strategic linchpin, linking and 
supporting all of the various sub-strategies, could take the 
form of ‘red lines’ that traverse the sub-strategies. These red 
lines should be normatively informed and relate to precepts 
of good global governance and, as noted, they should be 
connected with the internal realities of European integration. 
It may well be that the rise of Asian and other powers will 
challenge western notions of good governance and order, 
as may the equation of western notions of human rights and 
universal values with a number of Islamic cultures. Rather 
than avoid such debates, the EU and its members should 
embrace them since the recent (but still tentative) changes 
in the southern Mediterranean, Myanmar and even China 
itself suggest that they are not entirely antithetical to ‘western 
values’ or notions of democracy and multilateralism. What is 
sometimes portrayed as a crisis of liberalism may actually be 
more about the institutionalisation of a liberal world order at 
the multilateral level, but is not necessarily a contestation over 
‘the basic rules and principles of the liberal international order’, 
where the likes of China or Brazil ‘wish to gain more authority 
and leadership within it’26. What many of the EU’s so-called 
strategic partners are volubly demanding is a greater role in an 
international order which still largely resembles the post-war 
status quo and not the realities of the 21st century. 
In broad terms, ‘red lines’ can be defined as those principles 
that have inspired the Union’s ‘creation, development and 
enlargement’27. The treaty gives us many potential ‘red lines’, 
but two obvious ones spring to mind: multilateralism and 
the rule of law. Considerable effort would be required to 
move them from the realms of mantra to workable strategic 
elements. Multilateralism, as 
noted above, would require a 
greater willingness on the part of 
the Union and its members to end 
what is perceived by many to be 
the latter’s over-representation 
in many international forums. 
This has already become a litmus 
test for a number of strategic 
partners, like Brazil and India, 
of how sincere the EU and its 
members are about promoting 
multilateralism. In addition the 
EU is under pressure from not 
only the emerging powers but 
also the United States to engage 
in such a reassessment. In spite 
of the difficulties of any such 
reformulation of the representation of the EU’s members in 
the key multilateral bodies, it is hard to see how the Union’s 
multilateralism mantra will appear credible if the status quo is 
blindly defended.
The promotion of the rule of law as another potential red 
line could also play to the EU’s inherent strengths. It would, 
however, require much more thought about how it should 
be systematically applied across all aspects of the EU’s 
external action since the Union lacks any ‘comprehensive and 
authoritative framework enabling the EU to take stock and 
subsequently monitor rule of law compliance in any particular 
country in any given year’28.
Any red lines would then have to be ‘mainstreamed’ through 
the geographical desks of the EEAS and other relevant parts of 
the Commission and supported by the Member States. This is 
easier than it sounds since the predominance of geographical 
perspectives is reflected in many parts of the EU including in 
the funding instruments which tend to reflect the priorities of 
geographically-oriented regional or even country strategies. 
Only two of the eight principal funding instruments (Democracy 
and Human Rights and Nuclear Safety Cooperation) really 
qualify as thematic29. The transition to thematic and ‘joined-
up’ approaches will demand a shift of mindsets. It will also 
imply wrestling with fundamental questions about the nature 
of the EU’s actorness (What type of actor does the EU wish to 
be? Does it have aspirations to a global role or should it be 
primarily a regional actor? How comprehensive should its role 
be?), and a more critical approach to geographically-oriented 
‘strategic partnerships’. Above all, it would imply the willingness 
to think through the consequences for the EU’s external actions 
with those who violate red lines in their relations with the 
EU and, conversely, the willingness to use positive tools to 
encourage others towards their adoption and enforcement. 
While it could be argued that this is what the EU attempts to 
do with its current forms of conditionality, it has been done in 
a way that risks the promotion of double-standards which, in a 
variant of Gresham’s law, threatens to prove that bad practice 
drives out good. In cases such as Russia or Central Asia, 
legitimate questions concerning the nature of the regimes, 
the judicial systems, the treatment of minorities, freedom of 
the press and human rights, have tended to be muted in light 
of the need for energy. This has led to a kind of fatalism where 
well-intentioned normative elements are held hostage to 
energy security considerations. A strategic reassessment could 
recast this by suggesting that the relations with these countries 
are framed by inter-dependence 
and not dependence (since they 
need access to a European market 
willing to pay market prices as 
much as many of the EU members 
need their oil and gas). Changes in 
perception such as this could then 
introduce a normatively informed 
strategy, complete with clear red 
lines that underpin the Union’s 
fundamental aim of supporting a 
liberal world order to which there 
are no credible alternatives. 
The delineation of ‘red lines’ 
implies the need for both positive 
as well as coercive tools. The EU 
has well founded experience 
in utilising its more positive tools, such as financial aid or 
assistance and preferential trade agreements. It has the ability 
to use some punitive tools as well, such as sanctions. If the EU’s 
aspiration is to be a comprehensive actor it should also have 
the ability to bolster ‘red lines’ where needed. More often than 
not, the use of civilian or military crisis management resources 
will be humanitarian in nature, but they also relate to wider 
questions of regional or global security and post-conflict 
stabilisation and reconstruction. The question of whether the 
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EU can credibly adopt a broad strategic perspective and ‘red 
lines’ based predominantly on its substantial reserves of soft 
power, has been challenged since the end of the Cold War 
by constant reminders that the EU’s post-modern paradise is 
frequently challenged by the modern world surrounding it. 
No war please, we’re European
There is a difference between the decision to utilise soft power 
and the inability or lack of will to use harder power. The former 
is essentially a decision about the nature and character of the 
EU. The latter is a default position which on several occasions, 
such as in the Western Balkans, has resulted in EU reliance upon 
the United States to provide the harder power elements. The 
continuing behind-the-scenes dependence on America is all 
the more remarkable when the EU members maintain more 
active military personnel 
in uniform than the United 
States, but at the same 
time having less than 10% 
deployable. The traumas 
of the Western Balkans in 
particular provided a rude 
reminder about the nature 
of the modern world on the 
EU’s borders and provided 
the impetus for what became 
CSDP. 
The euro crisis may well 
imply that national austerity measures will further squeeze EU 
defence budgets which, in most cases, have been declining 
anyway for a decade or more (Denmark, Finland, France, Poland 
and Sweden are amongst those currently implementing 
significant cuts). A foreign policy-led perspective should 
suggest that even if there is any illusion left that its citizens live 
in a post-modern paradise, the world around us is distinctly 
modern or even pre-modern.  The launch of recent operations 
in the Sahel (EUCAP Sahel Niger), South Sudan (EUNAVSEC 
South Sudan) and the Horn of African (EUCAP NESTOR) are 
indicative of not only the growing awareness of the security 
challenges from these countries or regions, but also of the 
contribution that the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) can make in conjunction with longer-term instruments. 
A geo-economic perspective would suggest that at least 
the EU should have the ability to contribute, either alone or 
with like-minded allies, to the protection of vital trade routes. 
In spite of rhetorical support for CSDP, the ability of the EU 
to respond to either more demanding or multiple crises is 
conditioned by the hollowing out of armed forces, not to 
mention uncoordinated national budget cutting, which risks 
exposing the EU members to the effects of external instability, 
illegal migration, militancy and acts of terrorism. 
As unpopular as it may be domestically within the EU, the 
case should be made to reinforce the EU’s CSDP capabilities so 
that the Union is able to credibly embrace its comprehensive 
approach, first outlined by Javier Solana in 2003. Much can 
be done, as has been suggested in the past, by sharing and 
developing joint platforms, or enabling others to assume 
more responsibility for their own security by means of EU 
advice and training (the African Union being an obvious 
example). However, the EU still needs to establish its own 
credibility in this realm if it is to be respected. The net effect 
of over twenty missions spread over almost a decade needs 
to be more thoroughly assessed. Most of the missions have 
been civilian in nature, but they have left the EU no nearer to 
a properly joined up civilian-military response capability. The 
EEAS remains bifurcated with crisis management still largely 
separate from civil protection, crisis prevention, mediation, 
post-conflict stabilisation and sanctions. Bearing in mind the 
EU’s pretensions to be a ‘comprehensive’ security actor, much 
more energy needs to be devoted to thinking about linkages 
and how to do more with the same (and possibly less). The 
point is not to promote the harder security aspects per se, but 
to equip the EU so that it may cover a spectrum of responses 
ranging from softer options to harder ones at the other end of 
the scale.
The difficulties in responding militarily to the uprisings 
in Libya, which included the withdrawal of an Italian 
aircraft carrier mid-mission on financial grounds, the near 
exhaustion of British and 
French smart munitions, 
and with substantial 
behind-the-scenes support 
from America, provided 
an example of what has 
been memorably termed 
‘following from the front’30.  
The decision by Germany 
not to support military 
intervention, siding with 
the BRICS, meant that the 
resulting operation could 
not be a CSDP one. Eleven 
European countries eventually participated in a NATO led 
operation. If the Libya operations demonstrated Europe’s 
potential, it also showed its weaknesses. Not the least of 
which were the divisions within Europe, especially the wider 
concern of whether German interests in external actions 
will revolve around economic diplomacy and its own export 
needs. 
Although the Member States continue to pay lip service to 
pooling and sharing, vainly spurred on by the remonstrations 
of the recent Polish Presidency, decisions on defence 
expenditure continue to be made on the basis of national 
security requirements. The underlying issue is often presented 
as a capabilities question, but the underpinning lack of 
political will from the Member States is a more serious issue. 
Although a strategic review at the EU level would not solve 
these problems, it may encourage the Member States to think 
through the consequences of the increasingly obvious gap 
between rhetoric and sources. The willingness and ability of 
the EU to become a more credible partner in this particular 
realm is a key litmus test to the most important of the Union’s 
strategic partners.
The only real strategic partner
One potent reason to think through the linkage between 
the EU’s dwindling ‘soft power’ assets and the harder power 
aspects lies in the relationship with the United States – arguably 
the Union’s only real strategic partner in terms of the depth 
and breadth of the relationship. Although the relationship 
is primarily economic in nature, the security aspects should 
not be ignored. In the absence of a Congressional deal on 
deficit reduction, the U.S. faces automatic sequestration at 
the beginning of 2013 as per the Budget Control Act. Of the   
Dr Simon Duke
A foreign policy-led perspective 
should suggest that even if there 
is any illusion left that its citizens 
live in a post-modern paradise, 
the world around us is distinctly 
modern or even pre-modern. 11
$1.2 trillion in cuts, a sizeable portion (almost $500 billion) will 
fall on the defence budget. Even without this scenario, the 
costs of assuming global policing roles will soon be beyond 
the United States. In a refrain that is familiar to Americans 
from the 1970s, they continue to look for global partners and 
burden sharing. Libya was an example of just such as scenario 
where the European allies should have been able to step up 
to the plate. 
The EU is more likely to be a credible 
strategic partner, in the real sense 
of the word, if it is able to balance 
the extraordinary depth of mutual 
trade and (in particular) foreign 
direct investment (FDI) across the 
Atlantic with a more balanced security 
partnership. The admonishment 
by Robert Gates, former American 
Secretary of Defense, from February 
2010 bears repeating in this context: 
‘The demilitarization of Europe – where 
large swaths of the general public and 
political class are averse to military force and the risks that go 
with it – has gone from a blessing in the twentieth century to 
an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace 
in the twenty-first’31. Similar remarks have been made by the 
current Secretary of Defence, Leon Panetta, and they remain a 
significant impediment in transatlantic relations. 
A key part of any strategic assessment should therefore be 
how to strengthen transatlantic relations, based on a shared 
view of the need for a liberal world order. The EU is likely to 
have a far stronger hand in shaping American perceptions and 
actions as a credible partner rather than as an ‘impediment’. 
This would imply recognition 
that the transatlantic bargain of 
the 1950s needs replacing with 
a more relevant response to 
the geo-political realities of the 
21st century. A more principled 
EU may well be an occasional 
irritant to the United States, but 
if it were capable of assuming 
the burdens incumbent in 
shaping and defending a liberal 
world order, it may also be more 
respected. 
The objective of any such 
strategic realignment would not 
be to challenge China’s role vis-
à-vis the United States, or that of 
any other emerging power, but 
to reinforce the perception that 
the EU and the United States 
should jointly promote a common vision for the emerging 
international system, both through their mutual relations, as 
well as through those with third parties, and to stand by it. 
This would involve close and, at times, undoubtedly difficult 
discussions on defining and shaping common ‘red lines’ based 
on a clearer strategic understanding of the EU’s standing and 
that of its members on this issue. Notwithstanding occasional 
differences, the EU and the United States have far more in 
common than almost any other strategic partners and could 
mutually reinforce one another in promoting and defending 
common standards of global governance and a liberal world 
order. Canada and Japan could usefully be added to this list as 
natural allies of the EU in terms of their ability and willingness 
to promote shared principles and values.
Conclusions
The growing pressure to engage in a debate about the global 
role of the EU, from within and outside the EU, should be 
embraced. This debate should not 
be delayed due to the still uncertain 
outcome of the euro crisis. Rather than 
viewing the euro crisis and the quest 
for global strategy as disconnected 
issues, the linkages between them 
need to be stressed. The euro crisis has 
already had an impact upon the EU’s 
global image in a detrimental manner 
which, if left unchecked, will further 
damage the Union’s soft power and its 
global credibility. 
With this in mind, this contribution argues for a thorough 
strategic reassessment of the EU’s global role as a matter of 
priority. The question of whether it should build upon the 2003 
European Security Strategy and its 2008 review, or whether the 
drafting exercise should start afresh, is in many ways a secondary 
issue (although the latter may allow for a broader perspective 
beyond a potentially constraining security orientation)32. Any 
formal or informal strategic review should embrace, wherever 
possible, thematic or horizontal approaches (‘red lines’) with 
the intention of mainstreaming these concerns in an orderly 
fashion across the EU’s areas of geographical interest. Any 
such strategic review should also be subject to periodic 
reassessment, ideally to co-
incide with the early stages of 
planning for the next financial 
perspectives (every seven years 
in other words). 
Any worthwhile debate about 
the EU’s global role in the 
changing world will prompt 
some fundamental questions: 
What kind of Union do we wish 
to be? Do the Member States 
have the necessary vision, 
leadership, solidarity and public 
support to take us towards 
a common goal? These core 
questions are of equal salience 
to the euro crisis as they are to 
the EU’s wider global role. By 
striving towards a Union that 
is more coherent, effective 
and visible – the fundamental aims of the Lisbon Treaty in its 
external actions – some of the core questions underpinning 
the euro crisis will have been answered. The emergence of a 
more strategic, principled, directed and realistic EU is more 
likely to appeal to international partners than a Europe divided 
internally and adrift externally. 
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